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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine empiri-
cally the impact of financial reporting quality on 
information asymmetry in Iran. Using three dif-
ferent attributes of financial reporting quality in-
cluding: accruals quality, earnings persistence and 
earnings predictability, data analysis over a peri-
od of  five years (2008–2012) revealed that accru-
als quality is negatively and significantly associat-
ed with information asymmetry. We also find that, 
firms with more earnings predictability have lower 
level of information asymmetry. However, contrary 
to expectation, we fail to find a significant asso-
ciation between earnings persistence and Iranian 
firm’s information asymmetry. These findings have 
implications for policy makers, managers, investors 
and researchers in general and those in emerging 
markets in particular.
Keywords: Accruals quality, Earnings predict-
ability, Earnings predictability, Information asym-
metry.
Introduction
Information asymmetry exists when certain 
parties in a transaction have more information than 
the others. Therefore, there is possibility that those 
with more information take advantage of those with 
less information. There are two problems relating 
to information asymmetry: adverse selection and 
moral hazard. Due to lack of information, sub-op-
timal decision may have results, also known as ad-
verse selection problem. Information asymmetry 
may also lead those with more information to take 
advantage of those without information, or moral 
hazard problem. These problems cause investors 
to stay away from the market. This could lead to 
less liquid and less efficient capital market (Aker-
lof, 1970). Now, the question that arises is how to 
reduce information asymmetry? To do so, several 
mechanisms have been proposed in accounting and 
finance literature, including financial reporting 
quality. Studies in the areas of accounting and fi-
nance have endorsed the role of financial reporting 
quality in reducing agency problems. The quality of 
financial reporting is considered as a basis for com-
pensation contracts and on the other hand, as an 
important information source for shareholders for 
monitoring managers and hence, reducing the con-
sequences of information asymmetry (Lambert, 
2001). Financial reporting quality has received a 
great attention to the academicians and several re-
searches is done both in developed and developing 
countries. However, a little attention is paid to the 
emerging countries in general and Iran in particu-
lar. As such, the focus of the study is to acquire an 
understanding of whether the dimensions of finan-
cial reporting quality affect the level of information 
asymmetry amongst Iranian public listed com-
panies. This study also aims to provide addition-
al evidence that supports or rejects prior research 
findings in developed countries and to determine 
whether the findings can be generalized in Irani-
an market. Using a sample of 380 firm-year obser-
vations during the period 2008–2012, we find that 
accruals quality is negatively related to information 
asymmetry. In addition, we find that the infor-
mation asymmetry decreases if the earnings pre-
dictability increases. On the other hand, earnings 
persistence was not found to have any significant 
impact on information asymmetry. These findings 
contribute to the debate regarding the role of finan-
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cial reporting quality in reducing the level of infor-
mation asymmetry and provide valuable insights 
for managers, investors, regulators and accounting 
professionals. The remainder of the present paper 
is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews prior lit-
erature and includes our hypotheses. Section 3 dis-
cusses the research design and Section 4 presents 
the results of the empirical analyses and final sec-
tion contains the conclusions of the study.
Literature review and hypothesis 
development
The conceptual definition of  financial report-
ing quality is the precision with which financial re-
porting conveys information about the firm’s op-
erations, in particular its expected cash flows, in 
order to inform investors in terms of equity invest-
ment decision (Verdi,2006). This definition is con-
sistent with the FASB- SFAC No.1 which states 
that one objective of financial reporting is to inform 
present and potential investors in making rational 
investment decisions and in assessing the expected 
firm cash flow. Financial reporting quality is mul-
tidimensional and there is no single characteristic 
that can be used as a proxy for it. Since account-
ing earnings is regarded as being of paramount im-
portance by investors, some researchers have used 
earnings attributes as a measure of financial report-
ing quality. These attributes include accruals qual-
ity, earnings persistence and predictability. Several 
studies have been conducted about various aspects 
of the financial reporting quality. Affleck -Graves 
et al. (2002) in the research entitled “Earnings pre-
dictability, information asymmetry and market li-
quidity” and selecting a sample of 247 NASDAQ 
firms over a period from 1985 to the 1990 inves-
tigated the relationship between earnings predict-
ability and information asymmetry. Using multi-
variate regression model, the results of this study 
indicated that, firms with higher earnings predict-
ability have lower information asymmetry.
Francis et al. (2004) examined the relationship 
between some earnings attributes including ac-
cruals quality, earnings persistence, predictabili-
ty, smoothing, value relevance, timeliness and con-
servatism with cost of equity, for a sample of 3917 
companies from 1975 to 2001. The results showed 
that there is a significant negative association be-
tween cost of equity with accruals quality, earnings 
persistence, smoothing, value relevance and time-
liness. However, no significant relationship was 
found between earnings predictability and conser-
vatism with cost of equity.
Verdi (2006) examined the relationship be-
tween financial reporting quality and investment 
efficiency, in a sample of 38,062 firms -year obser-
vations during the period of 1980 to 2003. Using ac-
cruals quality as a proxy of the financial reporting 
quality, the results indicated a significant negative 
relationship between under-investment and over-
investment with financial reporting quality. This 
finding suggests that the quality of financial report-
ing reduces information asymmetry due to agency 
problems and will result in improved investment ef-
ficiency.
NG (2008) investigated the impact of account-
ing information quality on liquidity risk during the 
1987 to 2006. Using some earnings attributes such 
as accruals quality, earnings persistence and value 
relevance and also some attributes of the quality of 
management earnings forecasts including precision, 
frequency and accuracy of management earnings 
forecasts, as proxies for accounting information 
quality, the findings indicated that accruals quali-
ty, earnings persistence, precision and frequency of 
management earnings forecasts are negatively re-
lated to liquidity risk. However, no evidence found 
linking value relevance and accuracy of manage-
ment earnings forecasts with liquidity risk.
Bhattacharya et al. (2008) in their study investi-
gated the association between earnings quality and 
information asymmetry. In this study by selecting a 
sample of 11893 firm-year observations of   NYSE 
and NASDAQ firms during the years 1997 to 2004, 
the impact of earnings quality on information 
asymmetry were tested. Using accruals quality as 
a measure of earnings quality, the results revealed 
that higher earnings quality decrease the informa-
tion asymmetry around earnings announcements.
Hakim et al. (2008) examined the association 
between earnings quality and equity liquidity of 
Tunisian listed firms. They used accruals quality 
as a proxy for earnings quality and also used bid-
ask spread to measure liquidity. Based on a sample 
of 120 firm- year observations over a period from 
2000 to 2005, they found that there is a statistical-
ly significant relationship between proxy of earn-
ings quality and liquidity. Their results support that 
firms with higher accruals quality have lower bid-
ask spread and lower adverse selection spread com-
ponents.
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a fiscal year, where daily turnover is the ratio of the 
number of shares traded each day to the number of 
shares outstanding at the end of the day. The Ami-
hud (2002) measure of illiquidity, ILLIQ, is defined 
as the absolute value of daily stock return, divided 
by the daily dollar trading volume. It measures the 
trading volume needed to move the stock price. Be-
cause each proxy measures the information asym-
metry with noise and we are interested in the over-
all information asymmetry, we create a combined 
index based on the average docile ranking across 
the three measures. To do so, we rank these three 
individual proxies for information asymmetry (bid-
ask spread, share turnover and Amihud’s illiquid-
ity measure) into docils with the least transparent 
firms taking a value of 10 and the most transpar-
ent firms taking a value of 1. We then sum across 
the three rankings and scale them by a factor of 30 
(total possible points) and obtain a combined in-
formation asymmetry index (SUM). SUM ranges 
from 0.1 to 1, with higher values of SUM indicating 
more information asymmetry.
Independent variables
In terms of independent variables, because 
there is no agreed-upon metric for the financial re-
porting quality construct, we use three different 
measures as follows:
Accrual quality
Our measure of  accrual quality (AQ) is based 
on McNichols’s (2002) modification of Dechow 
and Dichev’s (2002) model, which separates accru-
als based on their association with cash flows by re-
gressing working capital on cash from operations in 
the current period, prior period, and future peri-
od, as well as the change in revenues and property, 
plant, and equipment (PP&E):
Biddle et al. (2009) in their study named “How 
does financial reporting quality relate to invest-
ment efficiency?”, and selecting a sample of 34,791 
firms - year observations from 1993 to 2005, exam-
ined the association between the quality of finan-
cial reporting and investment efficiency. The re-
sults indicate that higher financial reporting quality 
increases investment efficiency by reducing infor-
mation asymmetry and leads to reduction of over-
investment (under -investment). 
In the light of this theoretical and empirical lit-
erature, it is possible to formulate the following hy-
potheses:
H1: There is a significantly negative association 
between accruals quality and information asymme-
try.
H2: There is a significantly negative associa-
tion between earnings persistence and information 
asymmetry.
H3: There is a significantly negative associa-
tion between earnings predictability and informa-
tion asymmetry.
Materials and Methods
Sample
We select all publicly- listed companies in Teh-
ran Stock Exchange (TSE) over the entire duration 
of the estimation time period (2008–2012) as ini-
tial samples. Of  these initial samples, companies 
whose stock trading days are less than 25 in a quar-
ter and firms that are either missing financial vari-
ables or that have insufficient data are eliminated. 
Financial institutions, banking, finance and in-
vestment firms are also eliminated, since their ac-
counting and reporting environments differ from 
those in other industries. This gives a final sample 
of 380 firm-year observations from the fiscal years 
2008 to 2012.
Variables measurement
Dependent variable
The proxies we use to measure information 
asymmetry as the dependent variable, are bid-ask 
spread, share turnover and Amihud (2002) measure 
of illiquidity. The choice of proxies used in our study 
is supported by prior literature (Lang and Lund-
holm, 1996; Hakim et al., 2008 and Liao, 2009). 
We compute bid-ask spread as the daily closing ask 
price minus the closing bid price divided by the av-
erage of the closing ask and bid prices. We measure 
share turnover as the average daily turnover during 
Where:
ΔWC i,t = firm i’s change in working capital ac-
counts between year t−1 and year t;
Assetsi,t = firm i’s average total assets in year t;
CFOi,t-1 = firm i’s cash flow from operations in 
year t-1;
CFOi,t = firm i’s cash flow from operations in 
year t ;
CFOi,t+1 = firm i’s cash flow from operations in 
year t+1;
ΔSalesi,t = firm i’s change in sales between year 
t−1 and year t;
PPEi,t = firm i’s gross value of property, plant, 
(1)
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and equipment in year t;
v
i,t
 = firm i’s error term in year t.
For each firm-year, we estimate equation (1) 
using rolling ten-year windows. These estimations 
yield a series of firm and year-specific residuals, 
which form the basis for the accruals quality mea-
sure.  Accrual quality is equal to the negative value 
of the standard deviation of firm i’s estimated resid-
uals from equation (1), AQ(i,t)=-σ(v(i,t)).  A low nega-
tive value for AQ indicates good accrual quality.
 Earnings Persistence
Earnings persistence (PERS) can be measured 
as the slope coefficient estimate, ϕ
(1,i)
 , from an au-
toregressive model of order one (AR
1
) for annual 
earnings per share. (Francis et al., 2004; Kiattikul-
wattana, 2008):
(2)
Where: X
i,t
 is firm i’s net income before extraor-
dinary items in year t divided by the weighted av-
erage number of outstanding shares during year t. 
For each firm- year, equation (2) is estimated 
by using maximum likelihood estimation and roll-
ing ten-year windows. The value of the coefficient 
is used for measuring the persistence level. 
PERS = ϕ
1,i 
. A greater PERS value indicates 
more earnings persistence.
 Earnings Predictability
Our measure of earnings predictability is also 
derived from the firm and year-specific AR1 mod-
el.  Based on Francis et al. (2004) and Kiattikulwat-
tana (2008), we use the negative value of the stan-
dard deviation of the residuals from equation (2), 
PRED= − σ(v
i,t
).  A low negative value for PRED 
indicates that earnings can be predicted by previous 
earnings which implies a good predictability attri-
bute. 
 Control variables
This study also includes several variables that 
are frequently used in prior research to control for 
other factors influencing firm’s information asym-
metry. Among these factors are firm size, stock re-
turn volatility, growth opportunities and return on 
equity (ROE). Large firms may face less informa-
tion asymmetry because they tend to be more ma-
ture firms, have established and time-tested dis-
closure policies and practices, and receive more 
attention from the market and regulators (Har-
ris, 1994; Wasan and Boone, 2010). Chakravarty 
et al. (2004) suggest that stock volatility (VOL) re-
flects the level of uncertainty and can be used as 
a control variable for information asymmetry be-
cause greater uncertainty stimulates the acquisition 
of private information, which leads to a higher de-
gree of information asymmetry. Thus, Stock return 
volatility is also adopted as a control variable. An-
other important control variable is growth oppor-
tunities (GWTH), High-growth firms have greater 
information asymmetry because firms with high-
er growth prospects  are  less likely to provide sen-
sitive operating information  in order  to protect 
their competitive advantages and avoid attracting 
new entrants or increased competition from exist-
ing competitors (Liao,2009). Finally, ROE is used 
as a control variable because income-generating 
firms disclose more information to communicate 
investors of their good performance (Wallace et al., 
1994; Liao, 2009), therefore we expect a negative 
relationship between firm profitability and infor-
mation asymmetry.
Regression models
To investigate the association between financial 
reporting quality and information asymmetry, the 
authors estimate the following multivariate regres-
sion models:
SUMi,t=β0+β1AQ i,t+β2SIZEi,t+β3VoL,t t+β4GWTHi,t + 
β5ROEi,t + εi,t                                                              (3)
SUMi,t=β0+β1PERSi,t+β2SIZEi,t+β3VoL,t t+β4GWTHi,t 
+ β5ROEi,t + εi,t,                                                          (4)
SUMi,t=β0+β1PREDi,t+β2SIZEi,t+β3VoL,t t+β4GWTHi,t+β5ROEi,t 
+ εi,t,                                                                                      ( 5) 
Where, for firm i at the end of year t:
SUM  = combined information asymmetry in-
dex based on the average docile ranking across bid-ask 
spread , share turnover and Amihud’s illiquidity mea-
sure;
AQ = accrual quality, measured as the negative 
value of standard deviation of residuals from McNich-
ols’s (2002) model;
PERS= earnings persistence, measured as the 
slope coefficient from an AR1 model of annual earn-
ings per share;
PRED= earnings predictability, defined as the 
negative value of the standard deviation of the residu-
als from AR1 model;
SIZE: firm size, defined as log of firm’s total sales;
VOL:  Stock return volatility, measured as the 
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standard deviation of daily Stock returns;
GWTH: firm growth opportunities, defined as 
the market value of equity divided by book value of 
equity; 
ROE:  return on equity, defined as income be-
fore tax and interest to total equity;
 ε: the error term.
Results
Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics of variables used in the 
sample are shown in Tables I. As shown in Table 
I, mean of information asymmetry of the sample 
companies is 0.506, ranging from 0.1 to 0.92. We 
Variable         Mean           Median         Min                 Max                Std  dev.
SUM 0.506 0.515 0.100 0.921 0.192
AQ       -0.023 -0.011 -0.190 -0.0005 0.030
PERS                     0.715 0.765 -0.317 1.837 0.408
PRED             -0.045 -0.014 -0.461 -0.0008 0.078
SIZE                 11.777 11.693 10.634 13.994 0.585
VOL             3.078 2.248 0.241 25.305 2.866
GWTH              1.684 1.389 0.239 4.972 1.071
ROE                   0.195 0.188 -0.217 0.673 0.151
also observe that the mean and median estimate 
of accruals quality (AQ) are -0.023 and -0.011, re-
spectively. Similarly, the mean (median) values for 
earnings persistence and earnings predictability are 
0.715(0.765) and -0.045(-0.014). Firm size, deter-
mined as the natural logarithm of total sales has 
a mean (median) of 11.777 (11.693).  Moreover, 
sample firms can be seen as companies with in-
creased growth opportunities, as their market val-
ue of equity exceeds their book value by almost five 
times. Finally, in terms of profitability, the mean 
(median) ROE is 0.195 (0.188), respectively. These 
results suggest that Iranian listed firms have rela-
tively poor profitability during the test period with 
respect to ROE.
Table I. Descriptive statistics of the sample variables (2008–2012)
Notes:  SUM - combined information asymme-
try index based on the average docile ranking across 
bid-ask spread, share turnover and Mahmud’s  illi-
quidity measure ; AQ - accrual quality, measured as 
the negative value of standard deviation of residu-
als from McNichols’s (2002) model; PERS - earn-
ings persistence, measured as the slope coefficient 
from an AR1 model of annual earnings per share; 
PRED - earnings predictability, defined as the neg-
ative value of the standard deviation of  the residuals 
from AR1 model;  SIZE  - natural log of firm’s to-
tal sales;  VOL  - Stock return volatility , measured 
as the standard deviation of daily Stock returns ; 
GWTH -firm growth opportunities , defined as the 
market value of equity divided by book  value of eq-
uity and ROE -  return on equity defined as income 
before tax and interest to total equity.
 Regressions results
Table II presents the results for each of the es-
timated models. As can be noted from Table, the F-
statistic is significant at the 1 percent level in each of 
our three regression specifications, and several con-
trol variables are statistically significant. The models 
have high explanatory power, with adjusted R2 rang-
ing from 66 percent (model 1) to 67 percent (model 3).
The H1 states that there is a significantly nega-
tive association between accruals quality and infor-
mation asymmetry. As presented in Table II, The 
AQ coefficient is negative, as predicted, and statis-
tically significant at the 0.01 level, which indicates 
a significant negative relationship between accru-
als quality and information asymmetry; the analy-
sis thus supports H1. The H2 predicts that earnings 
persistence is significantly negatively associated 
with level of information asymmetry. As reported 
in this table, the coefficient of PERS is not statisti-
cally significant at the 0.05 level; this indicates that 
earnings persistence has no significant effect on in-
formation asymmetry; thus this hypothesis is not 
supported. Finally, The H3 states that the earnings 
predictability is significantly negatively associated 
with information asymmetry. As shown in Table, 
the coefficient of PRED in the Model is negative, 
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as expected, and is significant at the 0.01 level. This 
result indicates a significant negative relationship 
between earnings predictability and information 
asymmetry; thus providing support for H3. 
Variable Exp. Sign   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant ?     1.578
***
(3.61)
1.798***
(3.76)
1.689***
(3.64)
AQ -     -3.768
***
(-3.64)
PERS - -0.074
(-0.919)
PRED - -1.068
***
(-2.78)
SIZE - -0.101
***
(-2.68)
-0.107***
(-2.69)
-0.098**
(-2.47)
VOL + 0.000
(0.14)
0.000
(0.07)
0.000
(0.08)
GWTH + 0.026
**
(2.44)
0.025***
(2.41)
  0.023**
(2.24)
ROE - -0.088
(-1.70)
-0.098
(-1.83)
-0.088
(-1.71)
Adjusted R2 0.664 0.661 0.679
F-stat.     10.272***       10.137***      10.899***
Table 2. Multiple regression results
Notes: t-statistics are reported in parenthe-
sis; ***, and ** denote significance at the  0.01 
and  0.05  levels, respectively; AQ - accrual qual-
ity, measured as the negative value of standard de-
viation of residuals from McNichols’s (2002) mod-
el; PERS  - earnings persistence, measured as the 
slope coefficient from an AR1 model of annual 
earnings per share; PRED - earnings predictabil-
ity, defined as the negative value of the standard 
deviation of  the residuals from AR1 model;  SIZE 
- natural log of firm’s total sales;  VOL  - Stock re-
turn volatility , measured as the standard devia-
tion of daily Stock returns ; GWTH -firm growth 
opportunities , defined as the market value of eq-
uity divided by book  value of equity and ROE - 
return on equity defined as income before tax and 
interest to total equity.
Turning to control variables, the coefficients 
on SIZE confirms the negative relation between 
firm size and information asymmetry documented 
in other studies. In addition, the significantly pos-
itive coefficients on GWTH indicates that firms 
with higher growth opportunities are associated 
with greater information asymmetry. However, we 
do not find that ROE and Stock return volatili-
ty are associated with the information asymmetry.
Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to design an em-
pirical test, and then to provide evidence consis-
tent with this test, that enhances discussions as to 
whether and how financial reporting quality affects 
the information asymmetry. Using three measures 
of financial reporting quality (i.e. accruals quali-
ty, earnings persistence and earnings predictabili-
ty), and based on a sample of 76 Iranian listed firms 
from 2008 to 2012, the results reveal that the accru-
als quality affects the firms information asymmetry 
negatively, indicating that firms with higher accru-
als quality  have lower levels of information asym-
metry. This finding is consistent with those found by 
Hakim et al. (2008) and Bhattacharya et al. (2008) 
who reported that accruals quality is associated 
with lower information asymmetry. We also find 
that, earnings predictability is negatively related to 
information asymmetry. In this regard, the find-
ing is similar to that found by Afleck-Graves et al. 
(2002) who found a negative relationship between 
earnings predictability and information asymme-
try. However, our study does not find evidence to 
support the notion that earnings persistence is ef-
fective on mitigating the information asymmetry.
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Our findings have implications for policy mak-
ers, regulators, managers, investors and researchers 
in the emerging markets of Iran. While this study 
contributes financial reporting quality literatures, 
this study is not without limitations. Firstly, the 
sample only covers five years of Iranian data and an 
external validity problem exists that the results may 
not be transportable over different time periods and 
locations. Secondly, the model used in this study 
may omit some variables correlated with firm’s in-
formation asymmetry. While we have added some 
control variables, we may not have successfully 
identified all potential correlated omitted variables. 
Future research could conduct a longitudinal study 
to examine factors that contribute to the change of 
information asymmetry over time.
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